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SEVERAL YEARS ago, I spent many long hours in an outpatient medical clinic ministering to patients 
with stomach, liver, pancreas, colon and related 
gastrointestinal cancers One particular remark by a pa-
tient lingers with me, though every patient raised the same 
question in one way or another 4'Why do I," the person 
asked, "have liver cancer7 I never even smoked'" That 
question is both absurd and dramatically relevant 
although smoking plays a clear role in increasing chances 
of lung cancer, it is less a factor with other cancers This 
simple query exemplified a struggle that many ill people 
face as they search for a reasonable cause for their fate 
and wonder what they have done to bring it upon them-
selves. Few of my clients felt innocent, almost all blamed 
themselves in some way Practically none escaped a 
heavy sense of culpability These patients raised ques-
tions of responsibility, judgment and guilt, which peo-
ple susceptible to illness—that is, all of us—ask We can-
not help but search for meaning and messages in our 
suffering 
A sense of culpability in illness and death can provoke 
much personal anguish To some extent such anxiety has 
always been a reality across time and cultures, people 
have struggled with the connection between human 
behavior and misfortune, especially sickness and death 
Probably even the most rational or secular individuals 
have never fully believed that their actions, beliefs, at-
titudes and values are absolutely irrelevant to their in-
firmities or approaching death 
Today, however, the problem is more intense For a 
number of intriguing reasons, today's ill and dying per-
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sons believe strongly that they have caused their fate, 
even if only indirectly or subconsciously At the same 
time, ironically, they lack moral and spiritual resources 
to help them handle the responsibility 
Since the turn of this century, psychology, not religion, 
has provided the interpretive framework for these ques-
tions, in what sociologist Renee Fox describes as a "sin-
to-cnme-to-sickness evolution" ("The Medicahzation 
and Demedicahzation of American Society," Daedalus, 
Winter 1977, p 11) Problems formerly considered sins 
that should be dealt with by church authorities are now 
considered either crimes to be dealt with by legal authori-
ty or medical concerns to be cured by the scientific com-
munity Many people feel free to accept or reject a 
religious judgment that declares a certain behavior im-
moral They will change churches rather than behavior 
But if psychologists and physicians, now invested with 
new authority, define the same behavior as psychological-
ly abnormal, sick or cancer-causing, people will eager-
ly comply with the regimen that the doctors propose This 
leads us to tell the sick and dying that they "didn't eat 
their bran" or suffer from "type A" personality traits, 
rather than our acknowledging a more complex combina-
tion of factors contributing to their condition 
Freud's theory of the death instinct seems to support 
this idea that we bring our own destruction upon 
ourselves Torn eternally between eros and thanatos, we 
have an inner urge to return to an earlier state of in-
animate, inorganic existence, Freud claimed In the end, 
we each die of our own "internal conflicts," the self-
destructive death instinct killing us when our libido has 
been used up or fixated This idea captures the moral 
imagination of later psychology Kurt R Eissler, the first 
Freudian to devote an entire book to 77?^  Psychiatrist and 
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the Dying Patient (International Universities Press, 1955), 
argues that we should view death as a psychological event 
rooted in each person's own personality and individual 
life history—"the effect of an unconscious actively en-
gaged in the preparation of the lethal end." But it is Ed-
win S. Shneidman, a psychologist specializing in death 
and dying, who carries these ideas to an extreme: he 
maintains that we should revise the death certificate in 
light of Freud's psychiatric revolution to include the 
significant role that the deceased's intentions played in 
hastening his or her own death (Death of Man [New York 
Times Book Co., 1973]). Not only can we indicate 
whether death came naturally, accidentally or through 
suicide or homicide; we must also judge whether it was 
intended, subintended or unintended. This attitude reflects 
a new understanding of human responsibility, leading 
psychologists to scrutinize and evaluate an individual's 
character, values and goals and, in essence, to make 
moral use of psychological concepts in assessing the 
implications of illness. They label overeaters, under-
exercisers, smokers, the careless, foolhardy and impru-
dent as "death-seekers," "death-experimenters" and 
"death-initiators." 
Psychological theories of illness have become power-
ful means for inducing blame and, over time, have in-
fluenced changes in medical explanations of disease. The 
perception that disease is precipitated simply by a sole 
bacillus that can be isolated, diagnosed and cured by 
"magic bullets," as Rene Dubos (The Mirage of Health 
[Harper & Row, 1971]) calls vaccines, has come under 
increasing suspicion. The elimination of so many infec-
tious diseases such as smallpox, the plague, cholera and 
tuberculosis gave people hope that all diseases would 
disappear and led them to conclude that factors of per-
sonal responsibility for health were negligible. We still 
want to believe that medicine will uncover and cure the 
single cause of all disease. 
Yet despite medical advances, people continue to fall 
ill and die—but now from different types of maladies. 
Chronic degenerative diseases (cancer and heart diseases) 
have replaced acute, contagious, single-microbe diseases, 
and they often progress in a rather unpredictable and 
poorly understood fashion. Doctors can offer potential-
ly therapeutic interventions, but no absolute cures. They 
make only tentative, cautious, understated prognoses. The 
underlying physiological mechanisms and the means to 
prevent, control or cure continue to evade medicine. It 
offers only "half-way technologies," measures that can 
seldom do more than palliate the symptoms of an already-
established terminal disease. 
Our inability to prevent, control or cure major causes 
of death has forced us to question the "one-bug" model. 
Even though scientists have found cures for some 
diseases, Dubos and others suspect that the mere 
discovery of specific bacteria did not itself cause their 
decline. Rather, other factors—pure food, pure water and 
pure air—also played a part. The struggle with the com-
plex etiology of AIDS illustrates the dilemma: the 
discovery of the virus by scientists at the Pasteur Institute 
in Paris in 1983 did not automatically unlock the door 
to a cure; and having the virus will not necessarily make 
the carrier ill or cause the patient's death at any predic-
table rate. Researchers therefore call the mysterious in-
fluences on AIDS "cofactors," and they call forces that 
seem to exacerbate cancer and heart diseases their 
"multifactional" origins. "Multifactional origins" might 
mean anything from the variables of environment to 
value-loaded judgments about personal habits, behavior, 
"lifestyle" or even judgments about "the good life and 
the good society." Some theorists directly link cancer, 
for example, to a breakdown in close personal relation-
ships or to feelings of loss, anxiety, depression, hostili-
ty or hopelessness. For example, when someone we know 
suffers a heart attack unexpectedly, we find ourselves 
saying with surprise that the person never struck us as 
4
 'the kind of person'' who would experience heart prob-
lems. We have a certain personality type in mind when 
we make this judgment. Robert Morison goes so far as 
to argue that Wesleyan or middle-class virtues of 
cleanliness, prudence and moderation are the significant 
factors behind high health standards ("Rights and 
Problems formerly considered sins to be 
dealt with by church authorities are 
now medical concerns to be cured by 
the scientific community. 
Responsibilities: Redressing the Uneasy Balance," 
Hastings Center Report 4, April 1974, p. 3). 
Achieving good health and locating the determinants 
of disease and death are far more complex problems than 
previously believed. We continue to search for natural, 
external causes but have hypothesized that illness might 
also arise from problems like character deficiencies, 
neurotic or aberrant behavior or misguided lifestyles, or 
from unjust, oppressive social systems that breed poverty, 
ignorance and brutality or that fail to be fair in distributing 
scientific cures. We may no longer believe the religious 
tenet that because we sin we die. But we have replaced 
this idea with more insidiously punitive moralisms. 
At least this is Susan Sontag's suggestion in Illness as 
Metaphor (Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1977). Comparing 
attitudes toward cancer and tuberculosis, she demon-
strates that when naturalistic explanations fail, we blame 
the patient for the illness. For example, before knowing 
the physiological cause of TB, society portrayed its vic-
tims as excessively passionate, reckless or sensuous. Now 
we know that psychological excesses and moral faults 
are unrelated to TB's causes. Sontag doubts similar 
societal myths about cancer—that it is caused by repress-
ing emotions like anger, sexual desire or grief. Such 
myths suggest that people bear an unfair share of the 
responsibility for their own illnesses. 
Indeed, statistics do show that certain actions can lead 
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to ill health. Voluntary choices like smoking, overeating 
or failure to exercise can affect the diseases that are 
leading causes of death. Temperament, character and 
habits do influence our well-being; good health requires 
effort and self-discipline. "Over ninety-nine per cent of 
us," contends John Knowles, "are born healthy and made 
sick as a result of personal misbehavior and environmen-
tal conditions" ("The Responsibility of the Individual," 
Daedalus, Winter 1977, p. 58). Some suggest that rather 
than claim a right to health, we consider care for our 
own health an individual moral obligation or a public du-
ty. H. Tristram Engelhardt even contends that should a 
smoker get cancer and require treatment that burdens the 
general community, we can justifiably say "that he or 
she acted immorally with respect to the responsibility to 
avoid cancer and its public costs." Those persons are 
culpable; let them pay for their treatment, he concludes 
("Human Well-Being and Medicine," Science, Ethics 
and Medicine [Institute of Society, Ethics and the Life 
Sciences, 1976], p. 128). 
However, sifting out the elements of moral respon-
sibility poses slippery problems. Engelhardt's statement 
comes dangerously close to encouraging primitively 
moralistic judgments; we cannot possibly account for all 
of a disease's causes. For example, societal values and 
the media heighten the glamour and appeal of smoking. 
Nor can smoking be directly correlated with being 
generally irresponsible. No one, Daniel Callahan 
observes, has successfully demonstrated "that smokers 
are, as a group, generally less responsible, less moral 
individuals than nonsmokers" ("Health and Society: 
Some Ethical Imperatives," Daedalus, Winter 1977, p. 
31). Also, people who show no signs of certain unhealthy 
behaviors may still fall ill from the same diseases that 
ail people with problem behavior traits. "For that reason, 
if for no other," says Callahan, "it would be impossi-
ble to prove that someone's disease was the result of his 
culpable willful responsibility." 
WE DO NOT know how widening our sense of responsibility harms or helps our ability to deal 
with illness. With some problems like alcoholism, to 
relieve persons of blame and help them accept the fact 
that the illness is external to emotional, moral or spiritual 
faults paradoxically inspires them to be more responsi-
ble. They then live within the known physical limitations 
of the illness and take precautions. On the other hand, 
if we hold people responsible for their own health, we 
at least grant them a certain measure of autonomy and 
dignity—we consider them capable of responsible action 
and decision-making. Culpability thus functions as a "vir-
tue," according to Robert M. Veatch. 
The discussion raises still more questions. Is it "simply 
sinful," as Morison says, "for a middle-aged man with 
a family to smoke cigarettes . . . clearly and willfully 
increasing the probability that he would be unable [due 
to illness and death] to fulfill his responsibility to his fami-
ly or indeed, to society at large" ("Rights and Respon-
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sibility," p. 4)? If people have a right to healthcare and 
yet are irresponsible in their personal habits and behavior, 
have they limited their right in any way? Is the individual 
accountable, and to whom? In general, how much 
sacrifice of individual health can society demand in the 
name of general health? Or, on the other hand, how far 
should society go in using medical means to satisfy per-
sonal and sometimes idiosyncratic wishes? 
A deeper problem, however, is that mainstream culture 
does not provide ill people with resources to help them 
face these questions. They no longer have language with 
which to express the condemnation that they feel. The 
liver-cancer patient does not know how fully to account 
for the possibility of having failed to meet responsibilities 
or of being guilty for the onset of illness. People lack 
what Frederick Hoffman calls the "compensatory forces 
of remorse and penance'' necessary to comprehend com-
mission and atonement ("Morality and Modern 
Literature," in The Meaning of Death, edited by Her-
man Feifel [McGraw-Hill, 1959]). Moral responsibility 
for death is thrust upon them. Yet they are directed away 
from confessional and willed levels of moral development 
and understanding and are left with a poorly balanced, 
distorted moral economy: they cannot calculate their 
proper responsibilities for death as a predictable result 
of understandable causes. Without a developed ethical 
sense and a way to account for moral deficiencies, peo-
ple can no longer prepare for death. 
Personal anguish about culpability before illness and 
death was better managed within the modern medical 
model, which was developed at the turn of the century. 
The medical establishment at that time exhaustively ex-
plained illness and death in rational, scientific, "moral-
ly neutral" terms. Doctors certified that the causes of 
disease resided in micro-organisms, not in personal. 
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moral or religious factors. This assertion eliminated 
religious questions of meaning, mystery or moral im-
perative. People no longer used the concept of divine 
providence to explain death; they considered religious, 
spiritual and moral meanings superfluous. They felt 
blameless and by attributing illness to natural causes, the 
physician supported that view. 
Today, medical explanations no longer remove pa-
tients' culpability. When medical explanations fail, people 
are left to construct the meaning and moral message of 
their illness on their own. This process evokes profound 
anxiety and sometimes oddly punitive responses. Patients 
may blame themselves for behaving or even thinking the 
wrong way. Conversely, "good" patients who have pur-
posely not smoked, for example, expect "rewards" for 
their good behavior, such as being spared heart disease 
or lung cancer. People who contract one of these diseases 
become deeply troubled when doctors cannot determine 
its natural cause; they may develop a vague, haunting 
sense of moral failure. Furthermore, their sense of justice 
is upset when, as happens all too often, those who com-
pliantly avoid behavior that might aggravate their illness 
recover no more quickly—or in some cases even more 
slowly—than others who are less "well behaved." Such 
an experience is very disillusioning. 
MAINLINE THEOLOGY approaches these ques-tions only obliquely, if at all. In the past people 
perceived suffering and death as possessing some moral 
and religious message. But in the modern world, we've 
stripped these experiences of such meanings. Individuals 
now lack the spiritual and philosophical resources to help 
adjudicate accusations of blame, guilt or negligence in 
the face of illness and death. The religious and moral 
explanations of earlier centuries seem nonsensical, an-
tiquated, empirically inconsistent. In our demythologized 
world we calmly and coolly try to accept that death 
befongs to the essential nature of life—no more, no less. 
Thus many people who feel guilt or responsibility for 
an illness have nowhere to turn for explanation or 
support. 
Likewise, the church's rituals for dying have become 
largely a lost art. The experience of facing impending 
death forces the individual to reassess her life in wholly 
unfamiliar moral and spiritual ways, for which she is un-
prepared and inexperienced. The church's traditional 
moments of witness, exhortation, sorrow, pardon, ab-
solution, prayer and silence have been replaced by 
Elisabeth Kiibler-Ross's renowned five stages of denial, 
anger, bargaining, depression and acceptance. These are 
experienced internally and privately, unlike the church's 
rituals, which involved close moral and religious scrutiny 
of one's relations with oneself, one's neighbor and one's 
God. Without this religious support, people face death 
and God with a confusion and dread for which they no 
longer have words to name or comprehend. Medical 
ethicist Kenneth Vaux warns that in an age when we relate 
ill health to misbehavior—in much the same manner that 
sin and sickness were once equated—people need a 
theology of culture that undergirds our health-policy 
ethics. 
The problems are too big for an easy solution, but the 
church can certainly approach them more effectively than 
it has. Theologians and ministers should seriously attempt 
to retrieve significant historical resources as well as con-
temporary reflections. New conceptions of our respon-
sibilities for doing wrong, getting sick and dying will 
come from creative dialogue between moral and religious 
traditions—whether buried in Augustine or Freud—and 
from encountering people's experiences with dying. 
Augustine can help us construct such a theological 
response. Although Schleiermacher scolds him and other 
early church fathers for arguing that sin causes death, 
Augustine's understanding allowed him to discuss moral 
and religious realities that escaped Schleiermacher—and 
escape us today. We may find the idea of death as 
"curse" due to God's "judgment" abhorrent and alien. 
Yet these terms, understood in the context of Augustine's 
world, reveal his attempt to elucidate deeper issues. 
Augustine understood something of what many cancer 
patients struggle to articulate: that at some level humans 
bear responsibility for how they live and die. Likewise 
he understood our dire need for acceptance despite our 
failings. But his definition of acceptance differs 
dramatically from those of Kiibler-Ross and others, for 
his entails moral and religious sensibilities. This allows 
him to speak directly to the fear, despair and guilt we 
feel regarding illness and death. For Augustine, death 
demands a "penalty paid in the name of justice and 
piety," a penalty which can be paid not by humans, but 
by God. Rather than a passive, narcissistic peace, ac-
ceptance entails three rigorous activities: "the avoidance 
of sin and the cancellation of sins committed, and the 
award of the palm of victory as the just reward of 
righteousness" (City of God). Hence a good death is not 
a human act existentially lived out but an act of faith and 
reconciliation. It requires the sorrow of repentance, a 
certain salutary agony of self-denial, endurance in devout 
faith, and reconciliation with others and God. Through 
these acts, death, an evil in itself, is turned to good ad-
vantage; it becomes a way to true life. 
Paul Tillich attempts to describe the same reality in 
language less foreign to our post-Enlightenment ears. 
While he moves beyond Augustine's traditional formula-
tions, he attempts to retrieve value from the ideas behind 
them. He maintains that death is a law of both nature 
and morality. On the one hand, we have to die because 
we are dust; death is part of the natural order of living. 
But, on the other hand, "we have to die because we are 
guilty. That is the moral law to which we, unlike all other 
beings, are subject" (Shaking of the Foundations 
[Scribner's, 1948], p. 70). Even if religion no longer 
validates a direct connection, people fear and recognize 
on some level that they have brought misfortune upon 
themselves by not doing what they should have done or 
by subverting the rightful order of nature. Although 
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natural to every finite being, death also stands over 
against nature People must, as they stand above existence 
as free beings, ask themselves, " Is it true and good ex-
istence9" And they must demand that it be so Since this 
demand is never fulfilled, our awareness of having to 
die becomes the painful, guilt-ridden realization of the 
loss of the eternal—a loss for which each of us is respon-
sible, despite its tragic universality This explains, if only 
in part, why cancer patients raise questions about their 
own responsibility in causing or preventing their illness, 
and why people have trouble accepting disease and death 
as simply natural parts of life 
When death comes as more than fate—when it comes 
as condemnation—only one response can suffice 
forgiveness This takes into account the whole human 
experience, not only fear of extinction, but also fear of 
judgment and the recognition of guilt, sin and human 
brokenness Since we cannot freely realize our dreams 
and possibilities and inevitably fail to make the most of 
the gift of life, we can accept death only "through a state 
of confidence in which death has ceased to be the 'wages 
of s in , ' " the "state of being accepted in spite of being 
unacceptable" (The Courage to Be [Yale University 
Press, 1952], pp 169-70) Understanding Tillich's pithy 
phrase—"acceptance without suspending judgment"— 
might lead us to a fuller understanding of the complex 
association between doing wrong, becoming ill, and dy-
ing The language of acceptance should not lead us to 
shallow "forgiving and forgetting", forgiveness involves 
renewed participation in human community and objec-
tive powers of acceptance Both Tilhch and Augustine 
believe that this comes only through deeply suffering and 
paying a "heavy price," and undergoing a "tremendous 
toil ," not wholly on our own but through faith Other-
wise, it is "simply a self-confirmation in a state of 
estrangement" says Tilhch (The Meaning of Health [Ex-
ploration Press, 1984], pp 56, 224) 
Veatch claims that death is "our last quest for respon-
sibility" (Death, Dying and Tlie Biological Revolution 
Our Last Quest for Responsibility [Yale University Press, 
1976], p 11) Now more than ever before, we have more 
opportunity for such acts as leave-taking, and for direct-
ing to some extent the mode and timing of our deaths 
Yet paradoxically, numerous factors prevent us from fully 
taking on this "last responsibility " Time is ripe to begin 
to reclaim some of the resources that might lead us to 
a more nuanced formulation of the relationship between 
moral responsibility, illness, and death • 
have argued that his is the only world 
map that meets the concerns of people in-
terested in social issues UNESCO (the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization), the National 
Council of Churches, and Lutheran and 
Methodist groups are among the organi 
zations supporting Peters's map 
Peters's principal claim is that his pro-
jection shows all parts of the world in 
proportion to their true areas, while the 
Mercator Projection greatly distorts 
relative areas so that Europe, the Soviet 
Union, Canada and Greenland are shown 
as far larger relative to South America 
and Africa than they really are The lat-
ter regions include important parts of the 
Third World that are populated primarily 
by dark-skinned peoples, and the former 
regions are populated mostly by light-
skmned, industrialized peoples Peters 
concluded that the Mercator Projection 
draws its popularity in large part from ex-
aggerating the sizes of white-dominated 
regions and thus reflects a racist 
attitude—a serious charge if actually 
true 
There is no question about it small 
Europe does show up more prominently 
on the Mercator Projection than it does 
on others that maintain correct area 
relationships (and there are scores of 
these besides Peters's) It this unfortunate 
bias deserves to be corrected, why do 
cartographers object so strenuously to 
the claims Peters makes for his 
projection7 
Their objections fall into two general 
categories first, the simplistic proposal 
that the Peters Projection should be used 
exclusively (except possibly for naviga-
tion), and second the number of incor 
rect statements made about the projec 
tion, and therefore (by implication) about 
other projections 
Promoting the projection as a cure-all 
for mapping woes is indeed highly 
simplistic No one flat projection, 
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